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The purpose of our work is to explore contagious financial crises. To this end, we
use simplified, thus numerically solvable, versions of our general model [Goodhart, Suni-
rand and Tsomocos (2003)]. The model incorporates heterogeneous agents, banks and
endogenous default, thus allowing various feedback and contagion channels to operate in
equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of our work is to explore contagious financial crises. To this end we need a model
of heterogeneous banks with diﬀering portfolio; if all banks were identical, or there was only
one bank, there would be no interbank market and no contagion by definition. We also require
a set-up in which default exists, and can be modelled. Otherwise there would be no crises.
Similarly financial markets cannot be complete, since, if there were, all eventualities could be
hedged. Finally, since we are concerned with financial crises, there must be an inherent role for
money, banks and interest rates. We have constructed a rational expectations, forward-looking
dynamic general equilibrium model along these lines in Goodhart et al. (2003).
Default is modelled as in Shubik and Wilson (1977). By varying the penalties imposed on
default from 0 to infinity, we can model 100% default (0 penalty), no default (infinite penalty)
or an equilibrium default level between 0 and 100%. The main financial imperfection is that
we assume that individual bank borrowers are assigned during the two periods of our model,
by history or by informational constraints, to borrow from a single bank.1 Money is introduced
by a cash in advance constraint, whereby a private agent needs money to buy commodities
from other agents; commodities cannot be used to buy commodities. Similarly we assume that
agents needing money can always borrow cheaper from their (assigned) bank than from other
agents; banks have an informational (and perhaps scale) advantage that gives them a role as
an intermediary.
In our general model (Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2003)) there are a set of het-
erogeneous private sector agents with initial endowments of both money and commodities;
it is an endowment model without production. There is also a set of heterogeneous banks,
who similarly have diﬀering initial allocations of capital (in the form of government bonds)2.
There are two other players, a Central Bank which can inject extra money into the system,
e.g. by buying an asset or lending, and a Financial Supervisory Agency, which can set both
liquidity and capital minimum requirements and imposes penalties on failures to meet such
requirements and on defaults. We do not seek to model the actions of these oﬃcial players.
They are strategic dummies.
The game lasts two periods. Period one involves trading in bank loans, bank deposits
(including interbank deposits), a potential variety of other financial assets, e.g. an Arrow-type
security or bank equity, and commodities. Such trading is done in anticipation that nature
will randomly select a particular state, s ∈ S = {i, ii, ..., S}. In period 2, dependent on the
state actually selected, there is further trading in commodities; all loans, including interbank
loans, are repaid, subject to any defaults, which are then penalised, and the banks are in eﬀect
wound-up. The timeline of this model is shown in Figure 1.
In Goodhart et al. (2003) we demonstrate that such a model has an equilibrium and can
be solved. We show that financial fragility emerges naturally as an equilibrium phenomenon.
In our model financial fragility is characterised by reduced aggregate bank profitability and
increased aggregate default as in Tsomocos (2003a and b). Whenever such financial fragility
is present in the economy, the role of economy policy is justified. Regulatory and monetary
policies are shown to be non-neutral due to the lack of the classical dichotomy between the real
1Restricted participation can also arise as an outcome of banks aiming to outperform each other by introduc-
ing a relative performance criterion into their objective functions. For more on this see Bhattacharya, Goodhart,
Sunirand and Tsomocos (2003).
2Commercial banks are modelled as in Shubik and Tsomocos (1992). The modelling of banks is akin to
Tobin (1962 and 1982).
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1. OMOs (CB) 
2. Borrow and deposit in the interbank markets (B) 
3. Borrow and deposit in the commercial bank credit 
markets (B and H) 
4. Equity markets of banks (H) 
1. Trade in asset+commodity markets (H and B) 
1. Consumption at t=1 (H) 
2. Capital requirements’ violations penalties (B) 
Nature decides which of the s∈S occurs  
1. Commodity trading (H) 
2. Secondary tradings of banks’ equity (H) 
1. Assets deliver (H and B) 
2. Settlement of loans and deposits (H and B) 
3. Settlement of interbank loans and deposits (CB and B) 
4. Liquidation of commercial banks (CB) 
1. Consumption at t=2 (H) 
2. Default settlement  
(Penalties for capital requirements’ violations, loan/deposit 
requirement and asset deliveries (H and B)) 
CB= Central Bank 
B   = Commercial Banks 
H   = Households/ Investors 
t=1 
t=2 
Figure 1: The The Structure of the Model
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and nominal sectors of the economy. We also show that a non-trivial quantity theory of money
holds, and the liquidity structure of interest rates depends both on aggregate liquidity and the
risk of default in the economy. Finally, we address formally the Modigliani-Miller proposition,
and establish the conditions that cause its failure. In particular, it fails either due to limited
participation or incomplete (financial) markets or diﬀerent risk preferences among banks.
Given the scale of the model with b heterogeneous banks, n private sector agents, S states,
a variety of financial assets, default and default penalties, and a variety of non-linearities, it
is impossible to find either a closed-form or a numerical solution to the general model. The
purpose of this paper, therefore, is to present a smaller, specific version of this model which
can be numerically solved.
2 The Base-line Model
We first simplify the general model fully developed in Goodhart et al. (2003) to the case of three
households, h ∈ H = {α, β, φ}, and two banks, b ∈ B = {γ, δ}, with a Central Bank which
conducts monetary policy through open market operations (OMOs) and a regulator, which
fixes the bankruptcy code for households and commercial banks as well as sets the capital-
adequacy requirements for banks. The decisions of households and banks are endogenous in
the model, whereas the Central Bank and the regulator are treated as strategic dummies with
pre-specified strategies. The time horizon extends over two periods (t ∈ T = {1, 2}) and three
possible states (s ∈ S = {i, ii, iii}) in the second period.
Given the cash-in-advance constraint, money is essential in the model. There are 4 active
markets in this economy: commodity, consumer credit, interbank, and financial asset markets.
In period 1, the commodity, asset, credit and interbank markets meet. At the end of this period
consumption and settlement, including any bankruptcy and capital requirements’ violation
penalties, take places. In period 2, the commodity market opens again, loans are settled and
assets are delivered. At the end of this period consumption and settlement for default and
capital requirements’ violations take place. Also, commercial banks are liquidated.
In order to show inter-connections between banks, we need at a minimum two banks. One
bank, bank γ, is relatively poor at t = 1 and therefore has to seek external funds to finance its
loans. As in the general model, we assume a limited participation assumption in the consumer
loan market. Thus, bank γ lends to its nature-selected borrower, Mr. α. Bank γ can raise its
funds either by borrowing from the default free interbank market3 or selling its securities. In
general, there are a variety of financial assets, besides deposits and bank loans, that we can
introduce into the model, but owing to the size of the system, amounting to over 60 equations,
we can only do so one at a time. In our first base-line model, we introduce an Arrow-type
security, which the weaker bank (bank γ) can issue. This pays out 1 in state i in period 2, and
nothing in any other states. In this way, state i is regarded as the ‘good’ state whereas the
other two states, states ii and iii, are treated as ‘bad’ states.4 Bank γ can be thought of as
a typical straightforward small commercial bank. Its assets comprise only its credit extension
to the consumer loan market. This way we can focus on the eﬀects of policies on banks that
cannot quickly restructure their portfolios by diversifying their asset investments, perhaps due
to inaccessibility of capital and asset markets, during periods of financial adversity. The other
3 In section 3, we relax this assumption, allowing default both in the interbank and deposit markets.
4Note that since there are three states and two assets (loans and the Arrow security), markets are incomplete
and therefore equilibria are constrained ineﬃcient. Thus, there is scope for welfare improving economic policy
(both regulatory and monetary).
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bank, bank δ, is a large and relatively rich investment bank which, in addition to its lending
activities to its nature-selected borrower, Mr. β, has a portfolio consisting of deposits in the
interbank market and investment in the asset market (i.e. purchasing bank γ’s Arrow security).
Its richer portfolio allows it to diversify quickly and more eﬃciently than bank γ. As we shall
see later, this extended opportunity set enables bank δ to transfer the negative impact of
adverse shocks to the rest of the economy without necessarily reducing its profitability.
Given our restriction that agents can borrow only from a single bank, we need three agents,
two who want to borrow in period 1 (Mr. α and β), because they are comparatively more con-
strained in money and goods in period 1 relative to period 2, and want to smooth consumption
over time. The third agent, Mr. φ, is richer in both goods and money in period 1, relative
to period 2, and hence deposits money with the banks in period 1 and sells goods to the bor-
rowers. He deposits money with bank γ, which in equilibrium oﬀers the highest default free
deposit rate, and buys Arrow securities to transfer wealth from t = 1 to t = 2, and thus smooth
his consumption. In a sense, Mr. α and β represent the household sector of the economy in
which their main activity is borrowing for present consumption in view of future expected
income. On the other hand, Mr. φ represents the investors’ sector, with a more diversified
portfolio consisting of deposits and investments in the asset market, in order to smooth his
intertemporal consumption. At this stage we assume that the deposit rate is always equal to
the lending rate oﬀered by bank γ i.e. perfect financial intermediation.5
We summarise the structure of our base-line model in the following tables 1 and 2.
Table 1
Agent Bank
α β φ γ δ
Period 1 Poor in Poor in Rich in Weakly Well
goods/money goods/money goods/money capitalised capitalised
Period 2 Richer Richer Poorer
in goods in goods in goods
Table 2
State i State ii State iii
Good state Bad state Bad state
(Arrow Security pays-oﬀ)
We have chosen to begin with this specification since it is the simplest version possible given
that we need at least two heterogenous banks in order to analyse the intra-sector contagion
eﬀect within the banking sector via their interaction in the interbank and asset markets and
the possible inter-sector contagion eﬀect involving the real sector via the credit, deposit, asset
and commodity markets. Most importantly, by allowing two separate defaultable consumer
loan markets, default in one market can produce an additional channel of contagion to the
other and to the rest of the economy; a ‘consumer loan contagion’ channel.
In the following section (2.1) we formally summarise the agents’ optimisation problem and
the market clearing conditions. Section (2.2) then explains the resulting initial equilibrium
given the exogenous parameters. Section (2.3) shows the results of a number of comparative
statics exercise.
5An assumption that we shall relax in section 3.
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2.1 The Agents’ Optimisation Problems and Market Clearing Conditions
2.1.1 Household α and β’s Optimisation Problem
Each consumer h ∈ {α, β} maximises his payoﬀ, which is his utility of consumption minus the
(non-pecuniary) default penalty he incurs if he does not pay back his loans. He also observes
his cash-in-advance and quantity constraints in each period. These constraints are consistent
with the timeline of the model.
As in Goodhart et al. (2003) and Tsomocos (2003a and b), we assume that asset and loan
markets clear automatically via a background clearinghouse whereas commodity markets are
more sluggish. Put diﬀerently, agents cannot use contemporaneous receipts from commodities
to engage in other purchases.
max
{bh0 ,qhs ,vhsb},s∈S
Πh = [χh0 − ch0(χh0)2] +
X
s∈S
[χhs − chs (χhs )2]−
X
s∈S
λhsbmax[0, µ
hb − vhsbµh
b
]
subject to
bh0 ≤
µh
b
(1 + rγ)
(1)
(i.e. expenditure for commodity ≤ borrowed money from the consumer loan market)
χh0 ≤
bh0
p0
(2)
(i.e. consumption ≤ amount of goods purchased)
vhsbµ
hb ≤ ∆(2) + psqhs +mhs , s ∈ S (3)
(i.e. loans repayment ≤ money at hand + receipts from sales of commodity + initial private
monetary endowment in state s)
0 ≤ ehs , s ∈ S (4)
(i.e. 0 ≤ endowments of commodities)
χhs ≤ ehs − qhs , s ∈ S (5)
(i.e. consumption ≤ initial endowment - sales)
where,6
∆(x) ≡ the diﬀerence between RHS and LHS of inequality (x),
bhs ≡ amount of fiat money spent by h ∈ H to trade in the market of commodity, s = {0}∪S,
qhs ≡ amount of commodity oﬀered for sales by h ∈ H, s = {0} ∪ S,
µh
b ≡ amount of fiat money agent hb ∈ Hb = {αγ , βδ} chooses to borrow from his nature
selected bank b7,
6Since the notations used in this paper are extensive, we also summarise them in a separated glossary section
(section 8).
7 i.e. Mr. α borrows from bank γ whereas Mr. β borrows from bank δ.
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vhsb ≡ the corresponding rates of repayment in the loan market by household hb to his
nature-selected bank b in states s ∈ S,
χhs ≡ commodity consumption by h ∈ H in state s ∈ S,
λhsb ≡ (non-pecuniary) penalties imposed on h when contractual obligations in the consumer
loan market are broken,
rb ≡ lending rate oﬀered by bank b,
ps ≡ commodity price in s = {0} ∪ S,
mhs ≡ monetary endowment of household h in states s = {0} ∪ S,
ehs ≡ commodity endowment of household h in states s = {0} ∪ S, and
cls ≡ exogenous parameters in the utility/profit functions of agent l where l ∈ H ∪B.
2.1.2 Household φ’s Optimisation Problem
Mr. φ’s maximisation problem is as follows:
max
{qφ0 ,bφs ,bφj ,dφγ},s∈S
Πφ = [χφ0 − c
φ
0 (χ
φ
0)
2] +
X
s∈S
[χφs − cφs (χφs )2]
bφj + d
φ
γ ≤ m
φ
0 (6)
(i.e. expenditures for the Arrow securities + bank deposits ≤ initial private monetary
endowments)
qφ0 ≤ e
φ
0 (7)
(i.e. sales of commodity ≤ endowments of commodity)
χφ0 ≤ e
φ
0 − q
φ
0 (8)
(i.e. consumption ≤ initial endowment - sales)
bφi ≤ ∆(6) + p0q
φ
0 + d
φ
γ(1 + r
γ) +
bφj
θ
(9)
(i.e. expenditures for commodity in state i ≤ cash at hand + receipts from sales of com-
modity from period t = 1 + deposits and interest payment + asset deliveries)
bφs ≤ ∆(6) + p0q
φ
0 + d
φ
γ(1 + r
γ), s = {ii, iii} (10)
(i.e. expenditures for commodity in states ii and iii ≤ cash at hand + receipts from sales
of commodity from period t = 1 + deposits and interest payment)
χβs ≤
bφs
ps
(11)
(i.e. consumption ≤ purchases)
where,
bφj ≡ amount of money placed by Mr. φ in the Arrow security market,
dφγ ≡ amount of money that Mr. φ deposits with bank γ, and
θ ≡ asset price.
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2.1.3 Bank γ’s Optimisation Problem
Bank γ (similarly for bank δ) maximises its profits in t = 2 and suﬀers a capital requirement
violation penalty proportional to its capital requirement violation. Moreover, it observes its
liquidity constraints as described in the timeline of the model in figure 1.
Bank γ’s optimisation problem is as follows:
max
{µγ ,mγ ,qγj }
Πγ =
X
s∈S
πγs −
X
s∈S
λγksmax[0, k − k
γ
s ]
subject to
mγ ≤ µ
γ
(1 + ρ)
+ dφγ + θq
γ
j (12)
(i.e. credit extension ≤ money at hand + interbank loans + consumer deposits + receipt
from asset sales)
µγ + qγj + (1 + r
γ)dφγ ≤ 4(12) + vαiγ(1 + rγ)mγ + eγi (13)
(i.e. interbank loan repayment + expenditure for asset deliveries + deposit repayment ≤
money at hand + loan repayment + initial capital endowment in state i)
µγ + (1 + rγ)dφγ ≤ 4(12) + vαsγ(1 + rγ)mγ + eγs , s = {ii, iii} (14)
(i.e. interbank loan repayment + deposit repayment ≤ money at hand + loan repayment
+ initial capital endowment in state s = {ii, iii})
where,
πγs = 4(13) for s = i, and 4(14) for s = {ii, iii}
kγs = e
γ
s
ωvαsγ(1+rγ)mγ
, s ∈ S,
k ≡ capital adequacy requirement set by the regulator,
λbks ≡ capital requirements’ violation penalties on bank b ∈ B in state s ∈ S set by the
regulator,
ω ≡ risk weight for consumer loans,
mb ≡ amount of credit that bank b ∈ B extends,
qγj ≡ bank γ’s quantity supply of Arrow securities,
ebs ≡ initial capital endowment of bank b ∈ B in state s = {0} ∪ S,
ρ ≡ interbank rate, and
µγ ≡ amount of money that bank γ borrows from the interbank market.
2.1.4 Bank δ’s Optimisation Problem
Bank δ’s optimisation problem is as follows:
max
{dδ,mδ,bδ}
Πδ =
X
s∈S
πδs −
X
s∈S
λδksmax[0, k − kδs ]
subject to
dδ ≤ eδ0 (15)
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(i.e. deposits in the interbank market ≤ initial capital endowment)
mδ + bδj ≤4(15) (16)
(i.e. credit extension + expenditure for asset ≤ money at hand)
0 ≤ 4(16) + b
δ
j
θ
+ vβiδm
δ(1 + rδ) + dδ(1 + ρ) + eδi (17)
(i.e. 0 ≤ money at hand + money received from asset payoﬀs + loan repayments in state
1 + interbank deposits and interest payment + initial capital endowment in state i)
0 ≤ 4(16) + vβsδmδ(1 + rδ) + dδ(1 + ρ) + eδs, s = {ii, iii} (18)
(i.e. 0 ≤ money at hand + loan repayments in state s = {ii, iii} + interbank deposits and
interest payment + initial capital endowment in state s = {ii, iii})
where,
πδs = 4(17) for s = {i}, and 4(18) for s = {ii, iii},
kδi =
eδi
ωvβiδ(1+rδ)mδ+ωdδ(1+ρ)+eω bδjθ ,
kδs =
eδs
ωvβsδ(1+rδ)mδ+ωdδ(1+ρ)
, for s = {ii, iii},
ω (eω) ≡ risk weights for interbank market deposits (the Arrow security),
bδj ≡ amount of money placed by bank δ in the market of the Arrow security,
dδ ≡ bank δ’s interbank deposits, and
MCB ≡ money supply.
2.1.5 Market Clearing Conditions
There are 8 markets in the model (one commodity in t = 1 and three in t = 2, one asset,
the interbank and two consumer loan markets). Each of these markets determine a price that
equilibrates demand and supply in equilibrium.8
p0 =
bα0 + b
β
0
qφ0
(i.e. commodity market at t = 1 clears) (19)
ps =
bφs
qαs + q
β
s
, s ∈ S (i.e. commodity market at t = 2, s ∈ S clears) (20-22)
1 + ρ =
µγ
MCB + dδ
(i.e. interbank market clears) (23)
1 + rγ =
µα
γ
mγ
(i.e. bank γ’s loan market clears) (24)
1 + rδ =
µβ
δ
mδ
(i.e. bank δ’s loan market clears) (25)
θ =
bδj + b
φ
j
qγj
(i.e. asset market clears) (26)
8The price formation mechanism is identical to the oﬀer-for-sale mechanism in Dubey and Shubik (1978).
The denominator of each of the expressions (19-26) represents the supply side whereas the numerator divided
by the price corresponds to the demand. Note that this price formation mechanism is well-defined both in, and
out of, equilibrium.
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2.1.6 Equilibrium
Let σh = (bh0 , q
h
s , v
h
sb) ∈ R × R3 × R3 for h ∈ {α, β}; σφ = (qφ0 , bφs , bφj , dφγ) ∈ R × R3 × R × R;
σγ = (µγ ,mγ , qγj ) ∈ R3; σδ = (dδ,mδ, bδj) ∈ R3. Also, let η = (p0, p1, p2, p3, ρ, rγ , rδ, θ), Bh(η) =
{σh : (1)− (5) hold} for h ∈ {α, β}, Bφ(η) = {σh : (6)− (11) hold}, Bγ(η) = {σγ : (12)− (14)
hold}, Bδ(η) = {σδ : (15)− (18) hold}.We say that (σα, σβ, σφ, σγ , σδ; p0, p1, p2, p3, ρ, rγ, rδ, θ)
is a monetary equilibrium with commercial banks and default iﬀ:
(i) (a) σh ∈ Argmax
σh∈Bh(η)
Πh(χh), h ∈ {α, β, φ}
(b) σb ∈ Argmax
σb∈Bb(η)
Πb(πb), b ∈ {γ, δ}
and
(ii) All markets (19)-(26) clear.
2.2 Exogenous Parameters and Initial Equilibrium
The values of the exogenous variables are summarised in table I of appendix I. The numbers
chosen are mostly illustrative at this stage; at a later stage in this research we hope to calibrate
a revised version of the paper against real data. Thus, of itself a simulation of this kind is
not particularly interesting, though it was, because of the size of the system, technically quite
diﬃcult. However, of greater interest are the comparative statics arising from varying the
chosen inputs to the system. Armed with the propositions of the general model, we can trace
the equilibria of the simulations and study how the multiple markets and choice variables
interact. In turn, we can see how the many system-wide eﬀects determine price, interest rates
and allocations.
The values of commodity and monetary endowments of households are chosen so that Mr.
α and β (Mr. φ) are poor (rich) at t = 1, and therefore are net borrowers (lender). Similarly,
the selected value of capital endowments of banks ensures that bank γ is relatively poor at
t = 1 and has to borrow from the interbank and asset markets, and vice versa for bank δ.
Furthermore, the value of regulatory capital adequacy requirement is chosen to be suﬃciently
high (0.4) in order to ensure that all banks violate their capital requirements and thus are
penalised accordingly. The risk weight for consumer loans is set to 1, while that of interbank
loans and assets are set to 0.5, to reflect the fact that loans are defaultable and therefore
riskier than the other two types of assets. The rest of the exogenous variables/parameters
are chosen to ensure a reasonable initial Monetary Equilibrium with Commercial Banks and
Default (MECBD). The values of the initial equilibrium are shown in table II of appendix I. In
particular, they are chosen to ensure that the values of all the repayment rates are realistic, and
the interbank interest rate is lower than both the interest rates charged by both banks since
interbank loans are assumed to be default free and thus do not include a default premium.
Finally, the loan rate of bank γ is higher than that of bank δ so that Mr. φ chooses bank γ to
deposit.
2.3 Results
This section shows the eﬀects of changes in the exogenous variables/parameters of the model.
Table III of appendix I describes the directional eﬀects on endogenous variables of changing
various parameters listed in the first column. We solve the model usingMathematica. We first
guessed the initial equilibrium described in table II of appendix I. Then using Newton’s method,
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we calculated numerically how the initial equilibrium changes as we vary each parameter at a
time.
The analysis is conducted using the principles derived in Goodhart et al. (2003). Besides
the non-neutrality of both regulatory and monetary policies, we have also established the
following results:
(i) Liquidity Structure of Interest Rates:
Since base money is fiat and the horizon is finite, in the end no household will be left
with fiat money. Thus, all households will finance their loan repayments to commercial banks
via their private monetary endowment and the initial capital endowments of banks (recall that
banks’ profit is distributed to their shareholders). However, since we allow for defaults, the total
amount of interest rate repayments is adjusted by the corresponding anticipated default rates.
In sum, aggregate ex post interest rate payments adjusted for default to commercial banks is
equal to the total amount of outside money (i.e. sum of private monetary and initial commercial
banks’ endowments). In this way, the overall liquidity of the economy and endogenous default
co-determine the structure of interest rates.
(ii) Quantity Theory of Money Proposition:
The model possesses a non-mechanical quantity theory of money. Velocity will always be
less than or equal to one (one if all interest rates are positive). However, since quantities
supplied in the markets are chosen by agents (unlike the representative agent model’s sell-all
assumption), the real velocity of money, that is how many real transactions can be moved by
money per unit of time, is endogenous. The upshot of the analysis is that nominal changes
(i.e. changes in monetary policy) aﬀect both prices and quantities.
(iii) Fisher Eﬀect:
The nominal interest rate is equal to the real interest rate plus the expected rate of inflation.
We conclude this section by highlighting the key results that we obtain from this numerical
exercise.
2.3.1 An Increase in Money Supply
Let the Central Bank engage in expansionary monetary policy by increasing the money supply
(MCB) in the interbank market (or equivalently lowering the interbank interest rate(ρ)) (see
row 1 of table III in appendix I). Lowering the interbank rate induces bank γ to borrow more
from the interbank market and therefore to increase its supply of loans to Mr. α, pushing down
the corresponding lending rate rγ . Consequently, agent φ reduces his deposits in bank γ and
switches his investment to the asset market, pushing the asset price up slightly. Given lower
expected rates of return from investing in the interbank and asset markets, bank δ invests
less in these markets and switches to supply more loans to Mr. β, causing the corresponding
lending rate rδ to decline.
Since more money chases the same amount of goods, by the quantity theory of money
proposition, prices in both periods and all states increase. Prices in state i increase the most,
since Mr. φ has increased his demand for Arrow securities and therefore has more income to
spend on commodities in state i. Lower interest rates make trade more eﬃcient, since the
increase in liquidity results in lower default rates for both Mr. α and Mr. β, especially in state
i where Arrow securities pay oﬀ.9 Thus aggregate consumer default falls.
9Since our model is transaction based, lower interest rates generate lower ‘transaction’ costs to agents who
borrows. In principle, default therefore falls. In the limit, when interest rates are equal to zero and markets are
complete, full pareto optimality is obtained (see Corollary 2 of Tsomocos (2003a) for further discussion).
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Turning now to capital requirements’ violation, both banks break their capital requirement
constraints more than before, particularly bank δ. Higher repayment rates and credit extension
over-compensate for the decrease in interest rates and thus, for given capital, risk weighted
total assets increase. Bank δ, which is relatively richer than bank γ, violates its requirements
even more, since the marginal benefit of the increased profits is greater than the marginal
cost of the capital requirement violation. Thus, given an initially adverse capital requirement
position (and also banks’ inability to access capital markets to raise new equity), expansionary
monetary policy worsens their capital adequacy condition. The reason is that the extra profit
eﬀect dominates the capital requirement violation cost.
Both regulatory and monetary policies aﬀect credit extension. In addition, default and
capital requirements’ violation have diﬀerent marginal costs (due to the diﬀerent penalties).
So, there exists a trade-oﬀ between earning a greater excess return through interest receipts
and the cost of capital requirements’ violation. Thus, the interaction of the capital adequacy
ratio and credit extension should be analysed contemporaneously in order to determine the
optimal composition of banks’ assets. We also note that lower defaults on consumer borrowing
does not necessarily improve capital assets’ ratios since profit-maximising banks will respond
by lending even more.
As far as the welfare of the agents is concerned, the utility of Mr. α and the profit of bank γ
improve whereas profits of bank δ deteriorate. The welfare of Mr. β and Mr. φ remains almost
unaﬀected (slight improvement). The welfare improvement of Mr. α results from lower interest
rates, (and consequently a higher repayment rate on his loans and thus lower default penalties).
The higher expected prices in period 2 also contribute to the higher repayment rates, since
higher prices imply higher expected income from selling commodities. Thus, as predicted by
the Fisher eﬀect, higher prices imply lower real interest rates at t = 1 since nominal interest
rates fall. The profitability of bank γ increases, mainly due to lower consumer default which
dominates the higher cost of capital requirements’ violations. However, the positive spillover
eﬀect of lower consumer default for bank δ fails to dominate the lower revenue, due to lower
interest rates, whose profitability therefore decreases along with higher capital requirements
violations.
In sum, even though expansionary monetary policy improves aggregate consumer default
rates, it does not necessarily induce less financial fragility. Higher liquidity provides an incentive
for profit-maximising commercial banks to expand without necessarily improving their capital
requirements condition.
2.3.2 An Increase in the Loan Risk Weights applied to Capital Requirements
An assessment of the eﬀect of an increase in the risk weights on loans for both banks (ω) (see
row 3 of table III in appendix I) underscores the argument that those agents who have more
investment opportunities, and therefore greater flexibility, can mitigate the eﬀect of a negative
shock by restructuring their portfolios. In this simulation the initial condition of the economy is
adverse in the sense that capital requirements are binding and there is no access to the capital
markets to raise new equity; so the impact is procyclical. Bank δ will further reduce credit
extension to avoid the extra cost of the additional capital requirements’ violation penalty, and
bank γ in particular will increase its violation since it cannot switch its investments to maintain
its profitability. Consequently, its payoﬀ will be severely aﬀected both from reduced interest
rate receipts and also the higher penalties for capital requirements’ violation. In contrast, bank
δ reduces investments in both the loan and interbank markets and increases its investment in
the asset market.
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Bank γ, anticipating the higher expected capital requirement violation penalty, will increase
its credit extension to lessen its profit reduction, by borrowing more from the asset market and
thus lowering the asset price. Since bank γ will charge lower interest rates in order to increase
credit extension, deposits from Mr. φ decrease and, given lower asset prices, he switches to
invest more in the asset market. In contrast, bank δ, which diversifies away from the loan
market, increases its interest rates. Moreover, reduced investments in the interbank market by
bank δ increase the interbank market interest rate. Tighter credit reduces commodity prices
in all periods, except state i where the Arrow security pays and there is extra liquidity in the
economy. Higher interbank rates imply higher default rates except in the case where the Arrow
security pays oﬀ (i.e. state i). So, default by both agents increases on average, (even though
both of them maintain higher repayment rates in state i), because of tighter credit market
conditions for Mr. β and lower expected income for both Mr. α and Mr. β.
The profitability for bank γ is reduced substantially, whereas bank δ’s ability to restructure
its portfolio generates slightly positive profits, even though the aggregate profit of the banking
industry is reduced. Paradoxically, though, Mr. α’s welfare is improved. Because in eﬀect
bank γ follows a countercyclical policy in response to the higher risk weights, so lower interest
rates help Mr.α to borrow more cheaply and increase his consumption in period 1, thus slightly
improving his utility. However, Mr. β is hurt by the higher interest rate charged by bank δ.
Finally, Mr. φ’s utility is almost unchanged (with ambiguous sign), since the lower purchasing
power resulting from lower bank deposit rates is more than oﬀset by a higher return on his
asset investment.
Regulatory policy may be seen as a mirror image of monetary policy, since it directly
aﬀects credit extension via the capital requirements’ constraint. Moreover, banks without
well-diversified portfolios, and thus not so many investment opportunities, follow a counter-
cyclical credit extension policy that hurts them, but benefits their respective clients. The
countercyclical credit extension policy of not-well-diversified banks may also be thought of as
a built-in-stabilizer in the economy when regulatory policy becomes tighter and the economy
faces a danger of multiplicative credit contraction. On the contrary, banks that can quickly
restructure their portfolios transfer the negative externalities of higher risk weights to their
clients. Thus, restrictive regulatory policy in periods of economic adversity may enhance fi-
nancial fragility by inducing lower profitability, higher default and further capital requirement
violations.10
2.3.3 Summary of the Base-line Model Results
All the results of the various comparative statics are tabulated in table III of appendix I. Their
interpretation and analysis can be undertaken using the principles we have used so far. Here
we recapitulate the key results obtained from these comparative statics. First, in an economic
environment in which capital constraints are binding, which may be viewed as representing
adverse economic conditions, expansionary monetary policy can aggravate financial fragility
since the extra liquidity injected by the Central Bank may be used by certain banks to expand,
and in some senses to ‘gamble for resurrection’, worsening their capital position, and therefore
the overall financial stability of the economy. Thus, a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and financial
10As shown in Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson and Tsomocos (2003), if banks are allowed to choose the risk-
weights of their assets, they would opt for countercyclical risk-weight setting. In this way, they would lessen
the profit reduction induced by falling loan opportunities in the economy. And if they are not allowed to do
so by the regulatory authorities, then they would choose procyclical weights rather than forward looking ones,
thus exacerbating credit contraction in the economy.
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stability need not exist only for regulatory policies, but also for monetary policy.
Second, agents which have more investment opportunities can deal with negative shocks
more eﬀectively by using their flexibility to restructure their investment portfolios quickly as
a means of transferring ‘negative externalities’ to other agents with a more restricted set of
investment opportunities. This result has various implications. Among others, banks which
have no well-diversified portfolios tend to follow a countercyclical credit extension policy in
face of a negative regulatory shock in the loan market (e.g. tighter loan risk weights). In
contrast, banks which can quickly restructure their portfolio tend to reallocate their portfolio
away from the loan market, thus following a procyclical credit extension policy. Moreover,
regulatory policies which are selectively targeted at diﬀerent groups of banks can produce
very non-symmetric results, e.g. an increase in capital requirement penalty of bank γ vs.
bank δ (see rows 6 and 7 of table III in appendix I). When the policy is aimed at banks
which have more investment opportunities, e.g. bank δ, much less contagion to the rest of the
economy occurs since those banks simply restructure their portfolios between interbank and
asset markets without greatly perturbing the credit market, thus not aﬀecting substantially
interest rates and prices in the economy. On the contrary, when the same policy is targeted at
banks which have relatively limited investment opportunities, e.g. bank γ, they are forced to
‘bite the bullet’ by altering their credit extension. This produces changes in a series of interest
rates, and therefore the cost of borrowing for agents. This in turn produces a contagion eﬀect
to the real sector in the economy.
Thirdly, an improvement such as a positive productivity shock, which is concentrated in
one part of the economy, does not necessarily improve overall welfare and profitability of the
economy. The key reason for this lies in the fact that our model has heterogenous agents
and therefore possesses various feedback channels which are all active in equilibrium. Thus,
a positive shock in one specific sector can produce a negative contagion eﬀect in others, even
possibly causing the welfare and/or profitability of the whole economy to fall. For example,
if the commodity endowment of household α increases in state i (see row 9 of table III in
appendix I), his increased revenue leads him to increase his repayment rate on his loans. This
in turn pushes bank γ’s lending rate down considerably. This results in lower profitability for
bank γ, because higher repayments are outweighed by lower interest rate payments. Moreover,
the fall of commodity prices also adversely aﬀects Mr. β whose income from commodity sales
in state i drops.
3 Extension: Endogenous Defaults in the Interbank and De-
posit Markets
The comparative statics results shown in the previous section can be varied to incorporate a
diﬀerent set of assets. So, we next, briefly, describe an extended version of the base-line model.
In addition to our attempt to examine the robustness of our results in the previous section,
this extension aims at illuminating how the eﬀect of various shocks can generate contagion
eﬀects via the interbank and deposit markets. To that end, we modify the structure of the
model given in section 2.
First, we allow endogenous defaults in the interbank market, i.e. bank γ can default on its
interbank loans. Second, we allow separated deposit markets.11 Moreover, Mr. φ has a choice
to deposit his money with either bank. Bank γ’s deposit rate diﬀers from that of bank δ since
11Recall that in the previous comparative static we assume perfect financial intermediation, i.e. a perfectly
elastic demand for deposits by bank γ at the rate of interest equal to its lending rate.
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it is allowed to default on its deposit obligation to Mr. φ. Bank γ may also default on its
loans from the interbank market. Third, in order to incorporate these additional complexities
while retaining the model tractability, we simplify the model by removing the Arrow security.
Finally, we assume that the cost of default in the interbank and deposit market is quadratic.
This in turn implies that the marginal cost of default in these markets is greater as the size of
borrowing is larger. The detailed optimisation problems are given in appendix II. Moreover,
tables I and II of appendix III summarise the values of exogenous parameters and the resulting
initial equilibrium.
3.1 Results
Table III of appendix III describes the directional eﬀects on endogenous variables of increasing
various parameters listed in the first column.
3.1.1 An Increase in Money Supply
As in section 2.3.1, let the Central Bank engage in expansionary monetary policy by increasing
the money supply (MCB) in the interbank market (or equivalently lowering the interbank
market rate (ρ)) (see row 1 of table III in appendix III). Given a lower rate of return on
interbank market investment, bank δ borrows less from the deposit market and switches to
invest more in the consumer loan market by supplying more credit to Mr. β. Thus bank δ’s
deposit and lending rates both decrease. As the deposit rate of bank δ falls, Mr. φ, who now
has the option to diversity his deposits between banks γ and δ, deposits more with bank γ,
causing its deposit rate to decline as well. Moreover, given a lower cost of borrowing in the
deposit and interbank markets, bank γ borrows more from these markets and increases its
credit extension, thus lowering its lending rate oﬀered to Mr. α.
Due to the fact that bank γ borrows more both from the interbank and deposit markets
and the default penalty is now quadratic, it increases its repayment rates in these markets.
Given increased liquidity in the economy, all prices increase in both periods, however more
in the first period when monetary policy loosens.12 This in turn generates more income to
households; including those who sell their commodities in the second period. Thus, they all
increase their repayment rates in the consumer loan market. Bank γ violates more capital
requirements because its risk-weighted assets increase and it does not have access to equity
markets. Their risk-weighted assets increase because the eﬀects of higher credit extension and
higher borrowers’ repayment rates dominate the eﬀect of lower lending rates. In contrast,
bank δ violates less capital requirements since the eﬀect of lower lending rates coupled with
the eﬀect of lower interbank market investment dominate the eﬀects of higher credit extension
and higher borrowers’ repayment rates.
As far as welfare is concerned, both borrowers, namely Mr. α and β, improve their payoﬀs
due to lower borrowing cost and lower default penalties since they increase their repayment.
However, the creditor who in our case is Mr. φ suﬀers from lower deposit rates, thus his
expected income falls. This causes him to reduce his consumption in period 2. Similarly, both
banks end up with a lower payoﬀ. This is because the negative eﬀect of lower lending rates
dominates the positive eﬀect of higher repayment rates by both Mr. α and β.
12Note that in most models with liquidity constraints, there is always an overshooting phenomenon in the
period when a policy change occurs. For the same phenomenon in an international context, see Geanakoplos
and Tsomocos (2002).
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In sum, since there are separate deposit markets and default in the deposit market is also
allowed, the eﬀects we observed in the previous comparative static are now accentuated in the
banking sector where the profitability of both banks is reduced and financial fragility is further
increased. On the other hand, the welfare of both borrowers is now slightly increased due to
the presence of separate deposit and lending markets.
3.1.2 An Increase in the Loan Risk Weights applied to Capital Requirements
A tightening of regulatory policy by increasing risk weights on loans of both banks (see row 3 of
table III in appendix III) will have similar eﬀects as in section 2.3.2. However, some diﬀerences
will be noticeable particularly in the banking sector because we now allow for default in both
the interbank and deposit markets, and deposit and lending markets are now separated (i.e.
no perfect financial intermediation).
As before, tighter regulatory policy is a mirror image of contractionary monetary policy,
and so the interbank rate increases. Bank δ will further reduce its credit extension to avoid
capital requirements’ violation penalties, whereas bank γ whose portfolio is limited increases
its credit extension to maintain its profitability. So, bank γ’s lending rate decreases and bank
δ’s increases. However, bank δ has less flexibility than before because interbank loans are now
defaultable and the deposit/lending spread is variable. In other words, both bank γ and the
depositor can adjust their behaviour in the light of bank γ’s action.
We introduce quadratic default penalties that imply that the marginal cost of defaulting
is increasing. Thus, as regulation tightens, bank γ not only reduces its borrowing from the
interbank market, but also lowers its repayment rate to support its profitability. Bank δ
rationally expects higher defaults, and thus lowers its deposits in the interbank market, pushing
the interbank rate even higher. Given higher interbank rates, bank γ increases its deposit
demand oﬀering higher deposit rate to Mr. φ who in turn deposits more with bank γ and less
with bank δ. This pushes up the deposit rate of bank δ. Finally, since bank γ increases its
deposit demand and reduces its interbank loans, it increases its repayment of deposits while
reduces its repayment of interbank borrowing, given quadratic default penalties.13
Since both deposit rates increase, Mr. φ receives more income from his investments. He
is the buyer of commodities in period 2 and since more money chases the same quantity of
goods, by the quantity theory of money proposition, prices increase in the second period. Note
that this is in contrast with what happened in the previous comparative static where there
was no separated deposit market, which in turn implied that deposit and lending rates were,
by definition, restricted to be the same, since tighter credit was automatically translated to
lower income to depositors as well. Here we face a wealth redistribution from the banks to
their depositors.
Mr. α and β, anticipating higher expected income from their commodity sales, increase
their repayment rates on their respective loans. Finally, both banks, bank γ in particular,
increase their capital requirements’ violation. Again the bank with the richer portfolio will
follow a procyclical credit extension policy, whereas the one with the more restricted portfolio
will follow a countercyclical policy.
Turning to the welfare of the economy. Mr. α’s welfare is improved as before. However,
unlike previously, Mr. β’s welfare remains unaﬀected since higher prices in the second period
allow him to pay back his loans without increasing his commodity sales. Similarly, Mr. φ’s
welfare remains unaltered since the positive eﬀect from higher deposit interest payments is oﬀset
13Endogenous default and the ensuing penalties can be seen as altering the eﬀective payoﬀ of banks’ liabilities
which therefore forms an optimal liability portfolio, given its risk preferences.
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by the negative eﬀect from higher commodity prices in the second period. As before, bank
γ is hurt by higher capital requirements’ violation penalties. The main diﬀerence, however,
lies in the reduced profitability of bank δ. This occurs because bank γ now has a default
option and the separate deposit markets allow more room for Mr. φ to diversify his deposits.
Thus, we see that what matters is the number of financial instruments available to an agent
relative to others. In other words, when a wide array of instruments such as the default option
and separate deposit markets are available to everybody, then banks with stronger and more
diversified portfolios cannot simply transfer the negative impact of shocks to the rest of the
economy. Indeed, they must bear some of it themselves.
To summarise, as regulatory policy tightens in times of adverse economic conditions, bank
profitability is further aﬀected. In addition, default may also increase in the interbank market,
thus increasing financial fragility in the economy.
3.1.3 Summary of the Extended Model Results
The rest of the results are tabulated in table III of appendix III and can be analysed along
the same lines. In principle, they reinforce the conclusion reached in section 2. Expansionary
monetary policy may enhance financial fragility in the short run, and banks with more invest-
ment opportunities can cope with negative shocks more eﬀectively, thus limiting their profit
losses.
When the commodity endowment of Mr. α increases in state i (see row 9 of table III in
appendix III), bank δ supplies less credit to Mr. β and switches to increase its investment
in the interbank market. This is so because Mr. β is adversely aﬀected in state i by lower
commodity prices and thus defaults more to bank δ. Meanwhile, bank γ has a lower cost of
borrowing, and does not decrease its deposit rate commensurately. Indeed, the presence of the
deposit markets provides an extra degree of freedom to banks to vary optimally the deposit
and lending spread and thus depositors can diversify their deposits. Put diﬀerently, this is
testimony that a wider array of financial markets, typically, improves economic welfare. Thus,
unlike previously, although this shock which directly improves the welfare of one agent may
worsen that of the others, aggregate welfare now improves.
Regulatory policies targeted at the relatively more flexible bank δ, e.g. an increase in capital
requirement penalty of bank δ (see row 7 of table III in appendix III), now have more real
eﬀects in the economy. This is so because bank δ does not any longer have the opportunity to
invest in the asset market and consequently changes more forcefully its credit extension policy.
Credit extension changes have more direct eﬀects on the real economy since credit multipliers
are typically greater than asset multipliers. Put diﬀerently, given our initial condition, changes
in credit extension work through the budget constraints of agents who, in turn, decide how to
spend their extra liquidity. However, changes in the asset investment portfolio of banks aﬀects
not only the liquidity of the suppliers (i.e. agents), but also generates a price eﬀect. Thus, the
real eﬀect of asset portfolio changes is mitigated as contrasted to the credit extension changes.
The contagion eﬀects of a positive shock now depend largely on where the shock is initiated.
Financial fragility in the interbank and deposit markets now depends on the agent who was
first aﬀected by the shock. For example, when we conduct money financed fiscal transfer (i.e.
an increase in an agent’s money endowment) or a productivity shock (i.e. an increase in an
agent’s commodity endowment) to Mr. α in state i (see rows 2 and 9 of table III in appendix
III, respectively), average default in the interbank and deposit markets falls. This is so because
bank γ, whose client is Mr. α, borrows from the interbank market. However, the opposite is
true when the shocks emanate from Mr. β since his nature-selected bank (bank δ) is a net
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lender in the interbank market (see rows 10 and 18 of table III in appendix III).
In conclusion, policies must be context specific since one size does not fit all objectives
in heterogeneous models. In particular, real business cycle models that rely heavily on the
representative agent hypothesis are not able to address policy eﬀects in multi-agent economies.
As most of our experiments make clear, contagion and its impact to the various sectors of the
economy depends on the origin of the shock.
4 Conclusion
Large, and non-linear, models, such as Goodhart, et al (2003), normally do not have closed-
form solutions. They have to be solved numerically. This paper provides numerical simulations
of simplified versions of the above more general model.
The ability to do this shows that, in some senses, the model ‘works’. Moreover, it can
be made to ‘work’ in a massively wide variety of initial starting conditions, e.g. depending
on which asset markets are included in each variant of the model, and of comparative static
exercises to be run. Indeed, the exercises and results reported in Sections 2.3 and 3 are a
hugely boiled-down version, a precis, of the full set of exercises, both those that we have done,
and, even more so, those that we, in principle, could do. We selected a small sub-set of starting
conditions, and of comparative static exercises, with the aim of being both, (relatively), simple
and illustrative.
What then have we illustrated? These insights fall into two general categories. First there
are those characteristics of a monetary model which not only hold here, but should hold in
any well-organised model. We have emphasised three. The first is what we have termed the
‘quantity theory of money’, whereby monetary changes feed through into price and quantity
changes, both in the current and future period (t = 1, 2). We have assumed an endowment
economy, so the volume of goods is, by definition, fixed. But more, or less, everything else ‘real’
in the system does change, distributions between agents, ‘real’ interest rates, bank profitability,
default penalties, etc., etc. The system (and the ‘real world’) is non-neutral.
As noted, our model allows for non-zero expectations of future price inflation. Our model
also incorporates the Fisher eﬀect, whereby nominal rate (at t = 2) are a function of ‘real’
rates and inflation expectations. Finally ‘real’ rates, and rate diﬀerentials, are a function of
the temporal, and distributional, pattern of endowments (time preference), liquidity (i.e. the
amount of money injected into the system), and default risk, (the greater the risk, the higher
the required rate).
The second set of insights relates to the implications of the main innovative feature of our
model, which is that the real world is heterogeneous; agents and banks are not all alike. This
has some, fairly obvious, implications. The result of a shock may depend on the particular
agent, part of the economy, on which it falls. The response of a bank to a regulatory change
will generally depend sensitively on the particular context in which that bank finds itself, and
will vary as that context changes. The result of a shock can often shift the distribution of
income, and welfare, between agents in a complex way, which is hard to predict in advance.
In short, heterogeneity leads to greater complexity. What we lose, by including it in our
model, is simplicity; what we hope to gain is greater reality. In this latter respect, however,
simulations, such as these, are always somewhat lacking. We have chosen the initial conditions,
and so the outcome is the somewhat artificial construct of our own assumed inputs.
We accept this, and we oﬀer this paper, and these results, as a stepping-stone, a stop on
the route, of our continuing research. The next step will be to take our model, adjusted as
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may be necessary, to the actual data, to calibrate inter-actions between existing banks and
(sets of) agents. But that, for the time-being, is for the future.
5 Appendix I
Table I: Exogenous variables
Coeﬃcient of Endowment Penalty Others
risk aversion Commodities Money Capital Default CAR violation
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Table II: Initial Equilibrium
Prices Loans/deposits Capital/Asset ratio Repayment rate Commodities Assets
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Table III: Directional Eﬀects of an increase in exogenous
parameters on endogenous variables
p0 p1 p2 p3 rγ rδ ρ θ mγ mδ d
φ
γ dδ µα
γ
µβ
δ
µγ
M +
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
− − −
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
− −
≈
≈ ≈ +
≈
mα1 ≈ +≈ −≈ −≈ − + + −≈ +≈ −≈ − + ≈ ≈ +
ω ≈ + − − − + + − + − − − ≈ +
≈
−
λα1γ ≈ +≈ − − − + − +≈ +≈ −≈ − + − ≈ +
λβ1δ +≈
− + + + − + −
≈
−
≈
+
≈
+ − ≈ − −
λγ1k ≈ − + + + − − +≈ − + + − ≈ ≈ −
λδ1k ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ − ≈ ≈ −
eφ0 − + − − − − − +≈ ≈ ≈ − + − − +
eα1 + − + + − + + −≈ + − + − ≈ +≈ −
eβ1 +≈
− + + + − + − − + + − ≈ ≈ −
eγ1 ≈ − + + + − − +≈ − + + − ≈ ≈ −
eδ1 ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ − ≈ ≈ −
cα1 + − + + − + + −≈ + − + − ≈ +≈ −
Note: +(−) : substantial increase (decrease)
+
≈
(−
≈
) :weak increase (decrease), ≈: approximately equal
+/−:ambiguous eﬀect
Table III (continue)
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Table III (continue)
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φ
0 b
φ
1 b
φ
2 b
φ
3 b
φ
j b
δ
j q
γ
j
M +
≈
+
≈
≈ ≈ +
≈
+
≈
≈ ≈ ≈ +
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+ −
≈
≈
mα1 +≈
+
≈
−
≈
−
≈
−
≈
+
≈
−
≈
−
≈
≈ +
≈
−
≈
−
≈
+ −
≈
+
≈
ω + +
≈
−
≈
−
≈
− +
≈
−
≈
−
≈
≈ + − − + + +/−
λα1γ +≈
+ −
≈
−
≈
−
≈
+
≈
−
≈
−
≈
≈ + − − + − +
≈
λβ1δ −≈ −≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ + +≈ +≈ −≈ − + + − +/− −
λγ1k − −≈ +≈ +≈ + −≈ +≈ +≈ ≈ − + + − + −≈
λδ1k ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ + +
eφ0 −≈ +≈ −≈ −≈ +≈ +≈ −≈ −≈ + + − − + − −≈
eα1 + + +≈
+
≈
− − +
≈
+
≈
− − + + − + +
eβ1 − − +≈ +≈ + + +≈ +≈ − − + + − +/− −
eγ1 − −≈ +≈ +≈ + −≈ +≈ +≈ ≈ − + + − + −
eδ1 ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ + +
cα1 + + +≈
+
≈
− − +
≈
+
≈
− − + + − + +
Table III (continue)
Uα Uβ Uφ Uγ U δ UH UB
M +
≈
≈ ≈ +
≈
−
≈
≈ −
≈
mα1 +≈
≈ ≈ +
≈
+
≈
≈ +
≈
ω +
≈
−
≈
+/− − +
≈
≈ −
λα1γ + −≈ +≈ + −≈ +≈ ≈
λβ1δ −≈ +≈ +≈ − +≈ +≈ ≈
λγ1k −≈ +≈ +/− − − ≈ −
λδ1k ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ − ≈ −
eφ0 + + + + −≈ + ≈
eα1 + − + − +≈ +≈ −≈
eβ1 − +≈ + − +≈ +≈ ≈
eγ1 ≈ ≈ ≈ + ≈ ≈ +≈
eδ1 ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ +≈ ≈ +≈
cα1 − − + − +≈ −≈ −≈
Note: UH ≡ (Uα + Uβ + Uφ)
UB ≡ Uγ + U δ
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6 Appendix II
We only describe the problems for Mr. φ and the two banks since those of Mr. α and β remain
the same as in the baseline model.
6.1 Household φ
max
{qφ0 ,bφs ,dφγ ,dφδ },s∈S
Uφ = [χφ0 − cφ(χ
φ
0)
2] +
X
s∈S
[χφs − cφ,s(χφs )2]
subject to
dφδ + d
φ
γ ≤ m
φ
0 (A1)
qφ0 ≤ e
φ
0 (A2)
χφ0 ≤ e
φ
0 − q
φ
0 (A3)
bφs ≤ ∆(A1) + p0q
φ
0 + v
γ
sφd
φ
γ(1 + r
γ
d) + d
φ
δ (1 + r
δ
d), s ∈ S (A4)
χφs ≤
bφs
ps
, s ∈ S (A5)
where,
dφb ≡amount of money that Mr. φ deposits with bank b, b ∈ B
rbd ≡deposit rate oﬀered by bank b ∈ B, and
vγsφ ≡bank γ’s repayment rates in the deposit market in state s ∈ S.
6.2 Bank γ
max
{µγ ,µγd ,mγ ,vγs ,vγsφ},s∈S
Uγ =
X
s∈S
[πγs ]−
X
s∈S
h
λγksmax[0, k − k
γ
s ]− λγs [ µγ − vγsµγ ]2 − λ
γ
sφ[ µ
γ
d − v
γ
sφµ
γ
d]
2
i
subject to
mγ ≤ µ
γ
(1 + ρ)
+
µγd
(1 + rγd)
(A6)
vγsµ
γ + vγsφµ
γ
d ≤ 4(A6) + vαsγ(1 + rγ)mγ + eγs , s ∈ S (A7)
where,
πγs = 4(A7),
kγs =
eγs
ωvαsγ(1 + rγ)m
γ , s ∈ S,
vγs ≡ bank γ’s repayment rate in the interbank market in state s ∈ S,
µbd ≡ deposit demand by bank b, b ∈ B,
λγs ≡ default penalty in the interbank market imposed on bank γ in state s ∈ S, and
λγsφ ≡default penalty in the deposit market imposed on bank γ in state s ∈ S
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6.3 Bank δ
max
{dδ,µδd,mδ}
U δ =
X
s∈S
[πδs]−
X
s∈S
λδksmax[0, k − kδs]
subject to
dδ ≤ eδ0 (A8)
mδ ≤ 4(A8) + µ
δ
d
(1 + rδd)
(A9)
µδd ≤ 4(A9) + vβsδmδ(1 + rδ) + vγs dδ(1 + ρ) + eδs (A10)
where,
πδs = 4(A10), and
kδs =
eδ1
ωvβsδ(1+rδ)mδ+ωv
γ
s dδ(1+ρ)
.
6.4 Market Clearing Conditions
p0 =
bα0 + b
β
0
qφ0
(i.e. commodity market at t = 1 clears) (A11)
ps =
bφs
qαs + q
β
s
, s ∈ S (i.e. commodity market at t = 2, s ∈ S clears) (A12)
1 + ρ =
µγ
MCB + dδ
(i.e. interbank market clears) (A13)
1 + rγ =
µα
γ
mγ
(i.e. bank γ’s loan market clears) (A14)
1 + rδ =
µβ
δ
mδ
(i.e. bank δ’s loan market clears) (A15)
1 + rγd =
µγd
dφγ
(i.e. bank γ’s deposit market clears) (A16)
1 + rδd =
µδd
dφδ
(i.e. bank δ’s deposit market clears) (A17)
Equilibrium is defined similarly to that given in section 2.1.6.
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7 Appendix III
Table I: Exogenous variables
Coeﬃcient of Endowment Penalty Others
risk aversion Commodities Money Capital Default CAR violation
cα0 = 0.011118 e
α
0 = 0 m
α
0 = 0 e
γ
0 = 9 λ
α
1γ = 0.2 λ
γ
1k = 3 M
CB = 0.5
cα1 = 0.111429 e
α
1 = 27 m
α
1 = 2.9472 e
γ
1 = 1.7278 λ
α
2γ = 0.1 λ
γ
2k = 2 ω = 1
cα2 = 0.073333 e
α
2 = 27 m
α
2 = 3.015 e
γ
2 = 1.4108 λ
α
3γ = 0.05 λ
γ
3k = 1 ω = 0.5
cα3 = 0.066786 e
α
3 = 27 m
α
3 = 1.9015 e
γ
3 = 1.1161 λ
β
1δ = 0.2 λ
δ
1k = 4 k = 0.1
cβ0 = 0.010476 e
β
0 = 0 m
β
0 = 0 e
δ
0 = 21.5 λ
β
2δ = 0.1 λ
δ
2k = 2
cβ1 = 0.014740 e
β
1 = 27 m
β
1 = 3.3973 e
δ
1 = 2.0474 λ
β
3δ = 0.05 λ
δ
3k = 1
cβ2 = 0.105184 e
β
2 = 27 m
β
2 = 1.8518 e
δ
2 = 1.6555 λ
γ
1 = 1.576
cβ3 = 0.070840 e
β
3 = 27 m
β
3 = 2.5431 e
δ
3 = 1.3160 λ
γ
2 = 1.123
cφ0 = 0.040000 e
φ
0 = 45 m
φ
0 = 9 λ
γ
3 = 0.936
cφ1 = 0.007000 e
φ
1 = 0 m
φ
1 = 0 λ
γ
1φ = 1.685
cφ2 = 0.008673 e
φ
2 = 0 m
φ
2 = 0 λ
γ
2φ = 1.404
cφ3 = 0.010767 e
φ
3 = 0 m
φ
3 = 0 λ
γ
3φ = 1.203
Table II: Initial Equilibrium
Prices Interest rates Loans/deposits Capital/Asset ratio Repayment rate Commodities
p0 = 1 rγ = 0.65 mγ = 19.05 k
γ
1 = 0.06 v
α
1γ = 0.919 b
α
0 = 19.04
p1 = 1.1 rδ = 0.6 mδ = 21 k
γ
2 = 0.05 v
α
2γ = 0.9 q
α
1 = 23.5
p2 = 1.2 ρ = 0.48 d
φ
γ = 4.31 k
γ
3 = 0.04 v
α
3γ = 0.89 q
α
2 = 21
p3 = 1.3 r
γ
d = 0.48 d
φ
δ = 4.69 k
δ
1 = 0.06 v
β
1δ = 0.899 q
α
3 = 20
rδd = 0.4 d
δ = 5.24 kδ2 = 0.05 v
β
2δ = 0.87 b
β
0 = 20.95
µα
γ
= 31.37 kδ3 = 0.04 v
β
3δ = 0.866 q
β
1 = 24.355
µβ
δ
= 33.58 vγ1 = 0.963 q
β
2 = 22.82
µγ = 8.5 vγ2 = 0.95 q
β
3 = 20.4
µγd = 6.38 v
γ
3 = 0.94 q
φ
0 = 40
µδd = 6.58 v
γ
1φ = 0.954 b
φ
1 = 52.67
vγ2φ = 0.944 b
φ
2 = 52.61
vγ3φ = 0.935 b
φ
3 = 52.55
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Table III: Directional Eﬀects of an increase in exogenous parameters
on endogenous variables
p0 p1 p2 p3 rγ rδ ρ r
γ
d r
δ
d m
γ mδ dφγ d
φ
δ µ
γ
d µ
δ
d d
δ µα
γ
µβ
δ
µγ
MCB + +
≈
+
≈
+
≈
− − −
≈
−
≈
− +
≈
+ +
≈
−
≈
+ − −
≈
≈ ≈ +
mα1 ≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ − + + + + +≈ −≈ − − + −≈ + +≈ −≈ +
ω ≈ +
≈
+
≈
+
≈
−
≈
+
≈
+ + + +
≈
−
≈
+ − + − − ≈ ≈ −
λα1γ +≈
−
≈
≈ ≈ − +
≈
−
≈
−
≈
+
≈
+
≈
−
≈
+
≈
−
≈
+
≈
−
≈
+
≈
− −
≈
+
≈
λβ1δ +≈
−
≈
≈ ≈ +
≈
− +
≈
+
≈
−
≈
−
≈
+
≈
−
≈
+
≈
−
≈
+
≈
−
≈
−
≈
− −
≈
λγ1k ≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ + − − − − −≈ +≈ − + − +≈ − −≈ +≈ −
λδ1k ≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ +≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ +≈ −≈ − + − + + +≈ −≈ +
eφ0 − ≈ ≈ ≈ + + ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ + + ≈
eα1 +≈
− ≈ ≈ − + −
≈
−
≈
−
≈
+ − + − + − + +
≈
−
≈
+
eβ1 +≈
− ≈ ≈ + − +
≈
+
≈
−
≈
− + − + − + − −
≈
+
≈
−
eγ1 ≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ + − − − − −≈ +≈ − + − +≈ − −≈ +≈ −
eδ1 ≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ − + − − − +≈ −≈ − + − + + +≈ −≈ +
cα1 +≈
− ≈ ≈ − + −
≈
−
≈
+
≈
+ − − + + − + +
≈
−
≈
+
eδ0 + + + + − − − − − + + + − + − + +≈ ≈ +
eγ0 + + + + − − − − − + + − + − + − ≈ +≈ −
λγ1 ≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ −≈ +≈ −≈ −≈ +≈ +≈ −≈ + − + − − +≈ −≈ −
λγ1φ ≈ +≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ +≈ +≈ −≈ − + − + + +≈ −≈ +
mβ1 +≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+ − + + + − + − + − + − −
≈
+
≈
−
≈
mφ0 + + + + − − − − − + + + − + − + +≈ ≈ +
Note: +(−) : substantial increase (decrease)
+
≈
(−
≈
) :weak increase (decrease), ≈: approximately equal
+/−:ambiguous eﬀect
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Table III (continue)
vα1γ v
α
2γ v
α
3γ v
α
γ v
β
1δ v
β
2δ v
β
3δ v
β
δ v v
γ
1 v
γ
2 v
γ
3 v
γ vγ1φ v
γ
2φ v
γ
3φ v
γ
φ
MCB +
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
mα1 + ≈ ≈ + +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈
ω +
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
−
≈
−
≈
−
≈
−
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
λα1γ + + + + −≈ ≈ ≈ −≈ + +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈
λβ1δ −≈ +≈ +≈ −≈ + + + + + −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈
λγ1k ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈
λδ1k −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈
eφ0 + + + + + + + + + ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈
eα1 + −≈ −≈ + − +≈ +≈ − +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈
eβ1 − +≈ +≈ − + −≈ −≈ + +≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈
eγ1 ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈
eδ1 −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈
cα1 + −≈ −≈ +≈ − +≈ +≈ −≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈
eδ0 + + + + + + + + + +≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
eγ0 + + + + + + + + + −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈
λγ1 ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ + −≈ −≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈
λγ1φ +≈
−
≈
−
≈
−
≈
+
≈
≈ ≈ +
≈
≈ +
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+ −
≈
−
≈
+
≈
mβ1 +≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+ +
≈
+
≈
+ + −
≈
−
≈
−
≈
−
≈
−
≈
−
≈
−
≈
−
≈
mφ0 + + + + + + + + + +≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
Note: vαγ ≡ (vα1γ + vα2γ + vα3γ)/3, v
β
δ ≡ (v
β
1δ + v
β
2δ + v
β
3δ)/3, v ≡ (vαγ + v
β
δ )/2
vγ ≡ (vγ1 + v
γ
2 + v
γ
3 )/3, v
γ
φ ≡ (v
γ
1φ + v
γ
2φ + v
γ
3φ)/3
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Table III (continue)
bα0 q
α
1 q
α
2 q
α
3 b
β
0 q
β
1 q
β
2 q
β
3 q
φ
0 b
φ
1 b
φ
2 b
φ
3
MCB +
≈
≈ ≈ ≈ + ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ +
≈
+
≈
+
≈
mα1 +≈
≈ ≈ ≈ −
≈
≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ +
≈
+
≈
+
≈
ω +
≈
≈ ≈ ≈ −
≈
≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ +
≈
+
≈
+
≈
λα1γ +≈
+ ≈ ≈ −
≈
−
≈
≈ ≈ −
≈
≈ ≈ ≈
λβ1δ −≈ −≈ ≈ ≈ +≈ + ≈ ≈ −≈ ≈ ≈ ≈
λγ1k −≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ +≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ −≈ −≈ −≈
λδ1k +≈
≈ ≈ ≈ −
≈
≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ −
≈
−
≈
−
≈
eφ0 ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ + ≈ ≈ ≈
eα1 + + ≈ ≈ − −≈ ≈ ≈ − − + +
eβ1 − −≈ ≈ ≈ + + ≈ ≈ −≈ ≈ ≈ ≈
eγ1 −≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ +≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ −≈ −≈ −≈
eδ1 +≈
≈ ≈ ≈ −
≈
≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ −
≈
−
≈
−
≈
cα1 + + ≈ ≈ − −≈ ≈ ≈ −≈ ≈ ≈ ≈
eδ0 + +≈
+
≈
+
≈
+ +
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+ + +
eγ0 + +≈
+
≈
+
≈
+ +
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+ + +
λγ1 +≈
≈ ≈ ≈ −
≈
≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ +
≈
+
≈
+
≈
λγ1φ +≈
≈ ≈ ≈ −
≈
≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ +
≈
−
≈
−
≈
mβ1 − ≈ ≈ ≈ + ≈ ≈ ≈ −≈ +≈ +≈ +≈
mφ0 + +≈
+
≈
+
≈
+ +
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+ + +
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Table III (continue)
Uα Uβ Uφ Uγ U δ UH UB kγ1 k
γ
2 k
γ
3 k
γ kδ1 k
δ
2 k
δ
3 k
δ k
MCB +
≈
+
≈
≈ −
≈
− ≈ −
≈
−
≈
−
≈
−
≈
−
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
−
≈
mα1 + −≈ ≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ − −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −
ω +
≈
≈ ≈ − −
≈
≈ −
≈
− − − − − − − − −
λα1γ + −≈ +≈ −≈ ≈ + ≈ −≈ ≈ ≈ −≈ +≈ −≈ −≈ +≈ −≈
λβ1δ −≈ + +≈ ≈ ≈ + ≈ +≈ ≈ ≈ +≈ −≈ +≈ +≈ −≈ +≈
λγ1k −≈ +≈ ≈ +≈ −≈ ≈ −≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ +≈
λδ1k +≈
−
≈
≈ −
≈
−
≈
≈ −
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
− + + + ≈
eφ0 + + +≈
≈ ≈ + ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈
eα1 + − + −≈ +≈ +≈ ≈ − ≈ ≈ − + −≈ −≈ + −≈
eβ1 − + + +≈ −≈ +≈ ≈ + ≈ ≈ + − +≈ +≈ − +≈
eγ1 −≈ +≈ ≈ + −≈ ≈ + + +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +≈ +
eδ1 +≈
−
≈
≈ −
≈
+ ≈ +
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+ −
≈
−
≈
+ +
cα1 − − +≈ −≈ ≈ −≈ ≈ − ≈ ≈ − + −≈ −≈ +≈ −≈
eδ0 + + ≈ − + +≈ + − − − − − − − − −
eγ0 +≈
+
≈
≈ + − +
≈
+ − − − − −
≈
−
≈
−
≈
−
≈
−
λγ1 +≈
−
≈
≈ −
≈
+
≈
≈ +
≈
−
≈
−
≈
−
≈
−
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
+
≈
λγ1φ +≈
−
≈
≈ −
≈
+
≈
≈ +
≈
−
≈
+
≈
+
≈
−
≈
− − − − −
mβ1 −≈ + ≈ + + +≈ + −≈ −≈ −≈ −≈ − −≈ −≈ −≈ −
mφ0 + + −≈ − + +≈ + − − − − − − − − −
Note: UH ≡ (Uα + Uβ + Uφ), UB ≡ Uγ + U δ
kγ ≡ (kγ1 + k
γ
2 + k
γ
3 )/3, k
δ ≡ (kδ1 + kδ2 + kδ3)/3, k ≡ (kγ + kδ)/2
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8 Glossary
bhs amount of fiat money spent by h to trade in the commodity market, s = {0} ∪ S
qhs amount of commodity oﬀered for sales by h, s = {0} ∪ S
χhs commodity consumption by hin state s ∈ S
mb amount of credit that bank b extends
µh
b
amount of fiat money agent hb ∈ {αγ , βδ} chooses to borrow from bank b
µbd deposit demand by bank b
dφb amount of money that Mr. φ deposits with bank b
µγ amount of money that bank γ borrows from the interbank market
dδ bank δ’s interbank deposits
blj amount of money placed by agent (bank) l ∈ H ∪B in the Arrow security market
qγj bank γ’s quantity supply of Arrow securities
rbd deposit rate oﬀered by bank b
rb lending rate oﬀered by bank b
ρ interbank rate
ps commodity price in s = {0} ∪ S
θ asset price
mhs monetary endowment of household h in states s = {0} ∪ S
ehs commodity endowment of household h in states s = {0} ∪ S
ebs initial capital endowment of bank b in state s = {0} ∪ S,
πbs bank b’s profit in state s ∈ S
kbs capital to (risk-weighted) asset ratio of bank b in state s ∈ S
k capital adequacy requirement set by the regulator
λhsb (non-pecuniary) default penalties in the consumer loan market imposed on h in state s ∈ S
λbks capital requirements’ violation penalties on bank b in state s ∈ S
λγs (λ
γ
sφ) default penalty in the interbank (deposit) market imposed on bank γ in state s ∈ S
ω, eω, ω risk weights for interbank market deposits, Arrow security, and consumer loans, respectively
MCB money supply
cls exogenous parameters in the utility/profit functions of agent (bank) l where l ∈ H ∪B
vhsb the rates of repayment in the loan market by household h
b to bank b in state s ∈ S
vγs (v
γ
sφ) bank γ’s repayment rate in the interbank (deposit) market in state s ∈ S
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